Frank Sfarzo wrote:Has been a tough job (not to be repeated) but for the third time we wanted to take the reader right inside the dispute between Court and Defendant, reporting all technical aspects as expressed by the Court itself.
The first part is only data, but then the speech becomes quite refined. This is something quite different from the abstract you can find everywhere, something for very motivated readers, don't you even try if you are tired.
The Supreme Court remarks:
From the investigation, the following facts have emerged:
- The apartment showed no signs of being broken into.- Meredith had recently started a relationship with the boy downstairs, Giacomo.- Meredith had some very close English girlfriends, who have said that she was not interested in dating other guys.- She spent the evening of November 1 with her girlfriends at the home of one of them and, after watching a movie and eating dinner, she returned home at about 9 pm, telling her girlfriends not that she had a date but that she was tired and wanted to get to bed early.- The time of death is estimated to be around 11 pm on November 1 (if we presume the meal to have been consumed until 9 pm).- The probable cause of death is a meta-hemorragic shock due to a vascular injury to the neck made by a 'cut and tip weapon' [a knife]
-There were no unequivocal signs of rape.
- According to Nara C., living in a house more or less across from and above the house at Via della Pergola, about 2 hours after she went to bed (she says at around 9.30 pm), she heard a terrible scream of a woman, followed immediately by the footsteps of more than one person running away in different directions. - Another witness, Alessandra F., remembers of having met a black boy, at about 10:30-10:45 pm,who was running up the stairs of piazza Grimana.
- A bloodied shoe print found at the crime scene was compatible with the Nike shoes worn by Raffaele Sollecito at the time he was arrested.- A knife was seized from his house (it did not belong to the victim's house) with the DNA of Amanda Knox on the handle and, on the blade, that of Meredith Kercher (who had never been in Sollecito's house).
- The blood detected in the bathroom shared by Knox and Kercher was from both of them.
- A bloodied palm print found on the pillow on which the victim was lying presented 16/17 points of correspondence with Guede's right hand, which was on file with the police.
- Rudy Guede had been to the house on occasion, and admitted that he was there on the night Meredith Kercher was killed.
- His genetic profile is a match with the feces in the larger of the two bathrooms and with the biological material detected on a vaginal swab taken from the victim.
The suspect Guede offered this version of the facts:
He met Meredith Kercher at a friend's house on October 31. The next day he went to her house, where his sexual advances were interrupted only because he did not have a condom and the victim did not want to have unprotected intercourse.
While he was in the bathroom next to the kitchen, where he had gone, he heard the buzzer and then a loud scream coming from Kercher's room.
He rushed from the bathroom and into the girl's room where he saw, from behind, a male shape, slightly shorter than him, wearing a black jacket and a cap on his head.
He saw Meredith bleeding on the floor and tried to stop the assailant, who tried to hit him but then escaped because Guede threw a chair at him. Guede then tried to help the victim, who was still alive and trying to say something. He could make out just two letters: 'a' and 'f'. But he fled because he was terrified of the noise made by the people who appeared to still be lurking around there, and because he thought he would be accused of the crime. He was unable to call for emergency assistance because he had no phone and because he feared he would be taken for the assailant.
When he left, the room was tidy. A red duvet was on the bed, the victim was totally dressed, and the door to the room was open.
The Court of Reexamination remarked that this version of facts is not reliable because it is inconsistent with some objective findings and certain logical arguments, and because it is undermined by decisive falsehoods.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the serious circumstantial combination of clues linking the suspect to the crime was valid, and that the story told by the suspect was an attempt to explain the physical evidence of his presence at the crime scene.
The Court has also ruled that all the precautionary requirements of art. 274 c.p.p. were satisfied and could be guaranteed only through continued detention.
Here is what the suspect countered, through his lawyer Walter Biscotti.
The knife with Meredith's DNA was found at someone else's place of residence, and the prosecutor has attributed the execution of the murder to other people, without describing my role in cooperating in the crime or advancing arguments for it. Accordingly, the principle of 'co-operation of a group in a crime' was wrongly applied.
Indeed, my mere presence at the crime scene does not prove my co-operation in the crime because if one considers that a co-operative crime has a unitary nature, it is necessary to analyze the conduct of every single suspect in order to demonstrate a necessary link —material, functional or psychological— to the commission of the crime itself.
In order to assess the serious clues of guilt we must consider the peculiarity of the investigatory phase, which implies the necessary fluidity of the charges (S.C. 2004 and 1996). This means that new data can still be added to the investigative picture. Accordingly, an exhaustive definition of conduct and psychological elements is not necessary.
It is true that, even during the preliminary investigations, when we have a group crime every participant must have acted with knowledge of the role of the others, and must have willingly acted in concert (ex multis, S.C. 2003), but the "description" of the conduct, meaning the role of the co-participant, does not have to be a necessarily immutable datum between the time of notification and the final decision [i.e., the judge's sentence].
The principle of correlation between notification and sentencing is not violated—not even if we move from the charge of material co-participant to arrive at the role of moral co-participant.This case would mean a relationship of limitation and not of heterogeneneity between the first and second role (S.C. 2007, 2006, 2005). [the S.C. means that, in the eyes of the law, the first role (that of material co-participant) is not different in nature from the second role (that of moral co-participant), so the two roles are not heterogeneous].
Your role and conduct at this stage does not need to be fully understood by the judges. It is only necessary that your co-operation—conscious and deliberate—be indisputable with respect to the homicidal action. At this point, whether or not the Court's assessment of the role of author or material co-author, of sender, instigator, conscious 'strengthener' is attributable to you is a matter of indifference in so far as the application oh these measures [the ongoing detention] are concerned. From this perspective and within this scope, the Court's interpretation was correct. It moved from your admission of having been present in Kercher's apartment before, during and after the murder and of having spent time with her, even with incomplete sexual intercourse, for a long fraction of time, to then going to the toilet during those few minutes in which an unknown assailant allegedly entered the house and committed the murder, to then fleeing as soon as he met you, as you returned from tending to your physiological needs.
From the admission of your presence at the place, your acquaintance with the victim and the sexual intimacy you had with her, the Court, logically and thoroughly, excluded—because they are wholly lacking in credibility and indisputably false— your statements according to which you were supposed to meet the young girl. Your 'strategic' withdrawal to the toilet, the unexpected and violent appearance of the stranger, his immediate flight, even if he was armed and only because you threatened him with a chair, your version of the position and condition of Meredith's body and of your fingerprints near it, and your version of a separate flight —first of the aggressor and then of yourself (contrasting with the witness who heard more than one person fleeing right after the scream of pain launched by a woman).
The lack of any credibility of these versions led the Court to the logical conclusion that there are serious and concordant clues that your participation in the crime was active, conscious and deliberate, even though there is currently some doubt as to exactly how it happened.
The post-mortem report shows that the signs of sexual activity may result only from hurried sexual intercourse and does not confirm or deny the occurrence of rape.
Consequently, there are no arguments to support the accusation of sexual violence, of which I've been charged unjustly. Moreover, in the absence of sexual violence, the unifying reason for a collective crime falls.
It's undeniable that about the existence of grave clues of sexual violence the court has been brief. But this lack of argumentation is, in the sentence itself, evidently related to the assessment that this clue is not relevant for the purpose of affirming your evident and indisputable participation in the murder. For this reason, your claim that, without a clear clue of sexual violence even the subsistence of the clues of guilt for your participation to the murder would fall, is totally axiomatic.